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Is ethnicity a straight road to anarchy and chaos, violence and civil war? Or 
does it offer people a solid identity? Is democracy in Africa to be built on 
ethnic self-consciousness ߄ or does politicized ethnicity open the doors for 
human rights violations and genocide? Ethnicity is one of the most contro-
versial concepts in political discourse in Africa. For some, ethnicity is a 
recipee for ߋdivide and ruleߌ politics, a tool to disintegrate and destroy a 
state. For others it is the foundation for democracy. Others again claim that 
democracy will fail if it does not incorporate the different cultural traditions 
and ethic codes of the African ethnies. To be understandable for Africans, 
they believe, democracy has to build on their culturally determined practice 
of decision making by open debate and consensus. 
It happens not often that several new books are published at the same time 
on the same countries, which reach different conclusions from the same mate-
rial. Three recent books on politics in Ethiopia and Eritrea do just that: all 
three see Ethiopia at a crossroad which can lead to chaos or to a democratic 
future. They conclude so for very different reasons. Two articles and one 
book on Africa add to the context. None of them offer pleasant reading for 
the rulers. Together they may console both governments that there is no 
pressing need for change as long as their critics can not agree neither on the 
reasons nor on recommendations. 
THEODORE VESTAL presents Ethiopia today as a post- (or rather neo-) 
communist state trying to survive beyond the end of the Cold War. Leaders 
adapt the rhetoric of Western democracy but use it as a cover beneath which 
they continue their communist agenda with a abysmal record of suppression 
and human rights violations. They have engaged the currently ߋcorrectߌ polit-
ical and legal vocabulary in formulating a constitution which overtly promises 
to respect and protect all individual freedoms and human rights, but leaves 
room in practice for an all-embracing control by the ruling party. VESTAL 
discerns behind the faÆade of democratic elections and procedures a hidden 
agenda of total control of the economic resources and an orchestrated manip-
ulation of the political expressions of the population. 
VESTAL maintained a meticulous collection of facts, from the early years of 
the Transition after 1991 to the atrocities committed in the war against Eri-
trea, and even more so in the continuing silent war against critics in all parts of 
the own population. He describes how the victorious TPLF invited all other 
opposition groups into a cooperation in the Transitional Government. They 
knew that they could not succeed in keeping the wide and diverse empire 
together without the support, at least temporarily, from other ethnicities and 
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their resistance groups. But from the beginning, they demonstrated in their 
actions that they did not intend to keep the promises made for an open and 
democratic state. One after the other, those political movements that did not 
accept total domination by TPLF, were pressed out of the coalition and re-
placed by the loyal puppet parties in EPRDF. Their members were subjected 
to harassment and suspicion of being enemies, to arrests, torture and even 
extrajudicial killings.  
The facts are well known, and will hardly be disputed. Yet the supporters 
of the regime will discredit VESTAL߈s book not because they can refute the 
facts he presents. They will stamp him as partisan, by identifying him with 
one of the two major strains of opposition against the TPLF/EPRDF regime. 
They will doubtlessly discard his book as built on exaggeration of individual 
cases and events out of the larger context. They will accuse him of dwelling  
on a few negative events but being silent about the merits and improvements 
of this regime.  
VESTAL makes no secret of his closeness to the nationalist Greater-
Ethiopia diaspora especially in the USA, a group that is politically on the 
extreme right, defending Ethiopian unity ߄ including Eritrea ߄ as if the 
Mengistu regime and its 17-year war against Eritrea never had happened. 
VESTAL߈s most cited source is ߋThe Ethiopian Registerߌ, one of the flagbear-
ers of a chauvinist political conservatism that offers prime minister Meles 
Zenawi a convenient adversary against whom to direct his propaganda and 
justify his politics. Serious scholars tend to shun this and similar organs of 
extreme positions in Ethiopian politics. VESTAL not only quotes it exten-
sively, he is an active author himself in the ߋEthiopian Registerߌ and one of its 
editorial advisers. This makes him a convenient target for criticism. 
This is a pity. VESTAL߈s book would deserve a better reception. It tells a 
fascinating story about how a new start was made full of hope and good in-
tentions of cooperation across ethnic and other dividing lines, and how this 
process was step by step frustrated and diverted, to consolidate the uncom-
promising power of just one ethnic and political group. The book is full of 
important details and facts, which are seen from one main perspective:  
VESTAL߈s political gospel is the protection of the neo-liberal ߋfree worldߌ 
against the sinister plots of communism. In this view, ethnicity is artificially 
revived by the TPLF in order to keep the non-Tigrean population split and 
divided. He records atrocities against members of such other ethnic groups, 
including their militant liberation fronts, as human rights infringements of  
the regime, but not as witness to alternative political concepts or ambitions for 
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independent identities of other ethnic groups. The critical stance of his book is 
summarized in one and a half sentences: ߋCould ߇crypto-communists߈ or 
߇nuevo conversos߈ to the gospel of Adam Smith hoodwink the donor nations 
and especially the United States into keeping the Front financially propped up 
and blessed at a time when the monied regimes were disparaging other Afri-
can governments for their democratic deficits and failures as guarantors of 
human rights? Apparently so.ߌ (page 115). And one is tempted to add, for 
clarity߈s sake: in spite of Ethiopia߈s recent record being considerably worse 
than that of most of the disparaged regimes.  
Why, then, did the United States allow themselves to be hoodwinked? For 
VESTAL this is a story of sly deceit or smart balancing between a democratic 
faÆade and a repressive practice out in the bush. The US government even 
helped the EPRDF to maintain a democratic faÆade sufficiently to allow con-
tinuing support, because they saw no credible alternative to the EPRDF in 
Ethiopia, and placed stability and order in the Horn of Africa higher than the 
concern for human rights abuses which were played down as isolated inci-
dents. They kept talking about a democratization process needing many steps 
forward, well realizing that the steps became gradually smaller or even turned 
backwards, while the road kept getting longer. 
VESTAL is preoccupied with the unity of ߋgreater Ethiopiaߌ. He writes that 
Eritrean independence ߋwas not popular to a majority of Ethiopiansߌ. Indeed, 
it was unpopular in the urban population, but that is a mere 10 to 15 % of the 
Ethiopian people. In the rural areas outside Tigray and possibly Amhara are-
as, people were more occupied with their own issues, and could not care less. 
Many of them had their own doubts whether they should opt for independ-
ence for their own ethnic group, rather than remaining in an Ethiopian state 
which they and their ancestors had experienced only as aggressor and a colo-
nising power. Yet, of course, the majority of emigrants in America come from 
the privileged and educated urban groups, for whom, after they had adapted 
to Amharic as predominant culture and language, Greater Ethiopia had be-
come the source of national pride. It is them VESTAL meets as ߋa majority of 
Ethiopiansߌ. 
In this way his analysis becomes essentially unhistoric, and ߋamericocen-
tricߌ. VESTAL shows little concern for the different views and interests of the 
many diverse ethnic groups in the wide country ߄ officially, there are about 
70 to 80 language groups ߄ who are, for good or bad, grappling with the 
problem of how to secure a minimum space for practicing their culture, for 
some degree of self-determination, for some pride. Or, if this proves impossi-
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ble, how to get out of Ethiopia altogether. VESTAL does not consider Ethio-
pia߈s history as a multi-ethnic conglomerate which was brought and kept to-
gether by shere force, at the same time as other African peoples were colo-
nised by European powers. These Ethiopian peoples have been subjugated to 
economic exploitation and living conditions which often bordered to slavery. 
As late as in the sixties, they were not allowd to use their own language in 
public context, and their leaders were persecuted for trying to revive their 
cultures. Even Mengistu߈s regime gave these people only one choice: to adapt 
to Amhara culture and identity or to remain second class citizens. Until to-
day, Ethiopia consists of a multiplicity of cultures, torn apart by violent trau-
mas of experience of the last 100 years, in which they participated, the ones as 
masters, the others as underdogs, in an oppressive empire, which was every 
bit as much acting as a colonial power as England or Belgia, except its rulers 
were Africans. (In fact, around 1860, Emperor Theodoros proposed to Queen 
Victoria to marry him, for the sake of creating a true world power.)  
How, then, is the ethnic problem experienced by rural people whose refer-
ence is not Greater Ethiopia, but their cattle, their farm land, their family and 
their village? For them the major issue is to keep at least some minimum con-
trol over the distribution of land and natural resources of their region. In 
practice, this means to keep the state authorities at distance as much as possi-
ble. They have experienced the state only as interfering in their management 
of resources, and appropriating a good portion of their produce. Their interest 
is to maintain as much influence as possible for their kin. Cultural traditions, 
the maintenance of age-old institutions of administering collective resources 
߄ such as grazing land, forests, water or wildlife ߄ and of local decision mak-
ing may well be essential rallying points in defending their autonomy against 
the incursions of other ethnicities and of the state. Defending their everyday 
access to productive resources, they reinforced their ethnic solidarity and 
identity.  
A fascinating book that offers ߄ among others ߄ an entirely different 
view on Ethnicity was recently published by PATRICK CHAVAL and JEAN-
PASCAL DALOZ: ߋAfrica Works. Disorder as Political Instrumentߌ. Africa 
works, these authors contend, but it works different, not following our yard-
sticks and not understandable with our paradigms. The authors challenge us 
to follow a different logic when looking at political Africa. What appears to us 
as disorder, may make perfectly sense to an African mind, thinking in terms 
of near and close relations, the family, the village, the tribe ߄ and hence in 
terms of ethnic solidarity but not state development. Occupied with personal 
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relations, a clientelistic structure and a vertical line of solidarity makes much 
more sense: a strong patron can indeed protect ߋhisߌ people from much of the 
adverse practice of the state.  
But how can African states develop without the loyalty of their people? Or 
should we rather ask: How can African people develop without states? CHA-
BAL and DALOZ offer no solution, but a new way to see why much of what 
we feel is essential and self-evident, just does not make sense to Africans. They 
may accept structural adjustment programmes, to get access to donor re-
sources. But Africa߈s clocks work different, yet they work; and what we con-
ceive as disorder, may for them just be a political instrument to achieve a dif-
ferent objective.  
Ethnicity is one aspect of what we from our European viewpoint conceive 
as part of disorder. For many Africans, it is a primary category of identity and 
orientation. For us, ethnicity appears as a centrifugal force threatening to 
blow up the structures of the state, to destabilize society and undermine de-
velopment. To an African, the state may be a moloch that disturbes peaceful 
life and threatens productive adaptations to the ecological and social envi-
ronment.  
Yet, Africa adopted the ߋOAU-doctrineߌ protecting the borders of the co-
lonial states, though the colonial state never had a base in ethnic or cultural 
identities or in African societies. In the hands of the colonial masters it was a 
tool to control resources and defend their power. As Basil Davidson has ar-
gued convincingly, the colonial state was handed over to elites which were 
dissociated from their societies, whose orientation was the European model of 
a nation state. Consequently the state became a tool for these elites to keep in 
power and maintain control over the resources. ߋNation buildingߌ was a pro-
ject essentially to adapt African societies to the needs of the state, not vice 
versa. So it was also in Greater Ethiopia, where the Abyssinian state ruled 
over its conquests, in size larger than the core empire, annexed at the same 
time as European powers colonised the rest of Africa. Social life continued 
outside the state, which was largely experienced by the rural majorities as a 
factor of life which one rather should keep at distance. ߋPolitics and electricity 
hurt ߄ if you don߈t keep your fingers offߌ says an Ethiopian proverb. Thus 
ethnicity grew into an alternative identity, in an agricultural society, where 
ninety per cent of the population experienced the State only as a power col-
lecting taxes and interfering in their work.  
The OAU doctrine accepts the state on an overt level. Uderneath, howev-
er, Africa works differently. Informalised relationships, personalised power 
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are more convenient to use for the average African, and clientelistic relations 
replace formal relations to the state and the law. The clan and the ethnic group 
take the place of the state in people߈s everyday life orientation. Under the 
surface, African leaders find a way to work for their own people. As long as 
everyone has someone to turn to, it pays better to work with your superior 
from your own tribe than for your ߋmateߌ in a distant and impersonal rela-
tionship. And the truly destitute is he who has no patron to relate to, as CHA-
BAL and DALOZ observe.  
Ethiopia is seen by many as the big exception: Ethiopia had an indigenous 
state, not inherited from a colonial power. Yet, a majority of its subjects expe-
rienced the Ethiopian state every bit as predatory and interfering. To keep the 
state at distance was probably even more essential for peasants߈ survival. Cer-
tainly the Ethiopian state tried to suppress ethnic identities earlier and more 
zealously, though with no more success than most colonial states.  
It is revealing to note that CHABAL and DALOZ quote Ethiopia߈s ethnic 
federalism after 1991 as a possible alternative model of dealing with ethnicity 
in Africa. Contrary to VESTAL who accuses Ethiopia of instrumentalising 
ethnic differences to divide the Ethiopian people, they see the federal constitu-
tion as a signal of hope. They argue that ethnicity could become ߋthe corner-
stone of more accountable political systemsߌ. A free unfolding of ethnic and 
cultural feelings can allow people to develop a personal self-consciousness 
without inferiority complexes. Only as self-conscious ethnic groups can Afri-
cans build larger forms of cooperation between equal but different clans and 
tribes and peoples. CHABAL and DALOZ seem to see the seeds of a true ߋrain-
bow nationߌ in the federal constitution of Ethiopia.  
As a vision, this may also be true for LEENCO LATA. Yet he sees present 
day Ethiopia at the crossroads, which may well lead to disintegration instead. 
The starting point of LEENCO߈s political analysis, diametrically opposed to 
VESTAL߈s, is the trauma of his people, the Oromo, after more than one hun-
dred years of political suppression, economic exploitation and cultural degra-
dation. Having been himself an active participant in the political struggles of 
the transitional period, LEENCO knows from the inside the potential of the 
political alliance of 1991. There was indeed a hope in July 1991 when all eth-
nic groups and political movements were invited to form a transitional gov-
ernment. Coopertion should have allowed all ethnic groups to develop a unity 
in diversity, a strong, relaxed self-confidence and cultural identity.  
The Oromo Liberation Front had originally a political agenda for a sepa-
rate state for the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. So had, prior to 
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1989, the Tigrean People߈s Liberation Front. OLF waged a new attempt at 
starting together in 1991. It cooperated with TPLF in the Conferences in 
London and in Addis Ababa, and OLF experts were among the chief archi-
tects of the Transitional Period Charter guiding the process of integration. 
The key was the liberation of all oppressed groups, and a vision of a voluntary 
cooperation of different, but equal cultures and peoples in one state of free 
Ethiopian peoples.  
But LEENCO describes how TPLF betrayed this hope. In his view, TPLF 
never had a genuine intention to share power. In 1991, they needed OLF and 
other ethnic movements to win confidence in the South. But already from 
autumn 1991, they systematically built up their puppet OPDO to replace 
OLF, and in the run-up to the 1992 elections they forced OLF out of the 
cooperation. The chance of 1991 was squandered, the prospect of ethnic free-
dom lost. 
The rest is a record of renewed suppression of all other ethnicities by the 
Tigray, with the Eritrean war as a final result. The Ethiopian polity is going 
towards increasing conflict. The lines become clearer: Tigray stands against 
the South, with the Amhara in between. But people do not tolerate suppres-
sion in the long run. Sooner or later they will revolt ߄ all the more as the 
Tigreans have less historical legitimacy than Haile Selassie had, and less revo-
lutionary enthusiasm, after Mengistu had discredited it thoroughly.  
LEENCO concludes that a solution can only be found in a regional context. 
The Oromo have to realize that the world has changed. Mengistu failed be-
cause the Cold War ended, and with it the possibility of getting support from 
the East. TPLF is still maintaining the support of the USA because of their 
interest in stability in the Horn. But TPLF is forced to increase repression as 
the peoples in the South demand the promises of 1991 fulfilled. Either this 
spiral is carried to the end, which is disintegration, or TPLF has to yield to 
pressure to open up for a new dialogue. 
To the address of his own people, LEENCO warns that the Oromo have to 
realize that armed struggle is no more a political avenue. Even an independent 
Oromia would have little choice but to enter into larger regional cooperation, 
also with other groups and states ߄ with parts of Tigray, Eritrea, Sudan, Dji-
bouti. If they get a fair level of freedom, cultural autonomy and political self-
determination, it may be advantageous for the Oromo to remain within an 
Ethiopian state which is free and democratic. The first step in the right direc-
tion is to overcome the old but revitalised trauma of being suppressed and 
culturally emasculated, in short, to experience freedom. The second step is to 
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re-organize Ethiopia to become a multi-ethnic society. For the Oromo, if the 
road towards the second is blocked by TPLF, the only alternative may be to 
go the first step alone. That would mean disintegration for Ethiopia.  
Ethiopia, thus, is rapidly approaching a crossroads. Either TPLF is pressed 
to accept setting the agenda anew, starting from where the Transitional Char-
ter of 1991 aborted the process, and bring Ethiopia together in a unity in di-
versity. This could bring the process of de-colonization and democratization 
to its logical end, a coexistence of nationalities, imbedded in a regional con-
text. Modern times demand larger, not smaller units, not division but integra-
tion and cooperation. A vision of many ethnicities in one society demands 
democracy practiced on all levels, based on the people, their sovereignty, and 
their cultural mechanisms for conflict management and consensus creation. 
For Ethiopia, LEENCO concludes, the choice is now to embark on the road to 
democratization. Or else, Ethiopia will end in disintegration, when the sup-
pressed ethnic groups decide to go the road to the future alone.  
LEENCO߈s book is more than a political analysis, it is, no doubt, every bit a 
political programme. More than that, it is a pedagogical exercise to the address 
of his own people and his own political movement. It is, not least, for the 
scholar and the interested reader an excellent document to allow a deeper 
understanding of the political predicament of those societies in the South of 
Ethiopia that were conquered by Emperor Menilek and forcefully integrated 
into the Empire during the 19th century. Without taking their needs and feel-
ings and their political visions into account, one could never understand the 
role of ethnicity in Ethiopia.  
How complicated and contradictory ethnicity can affect political progress 
and development, is demonstrated in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eri-
trea. TEKESTE and TRONVOLL try to make sense of it in their book ߋBrothers 
at Warߌ. One of the major lines of argument is that the two liberation move-
ments that were victorious in 1991 and took over the government in respec-
tively Eritrea and Ethiopia, had diametrically opposed policies on ethnicity. 
TPLF in Ethiopia insisted on ethnic federalism, embraced ߋself-determination 
up to and including secessionߌ for all ethnic groups, and promised a demo-
cratic federal state built on a voluntary cooperation of self-administered re-
gional states.  
TEKESTE and TRONVOLL demonstrate that this policy was from the outset 
in collision with the Eritrean state formation. EPLF ߄ later re-named PFDJ 
߄ insisted that the common experience of 30 years of struggle had melted all 
Eritreans into one nation, regardless of language, religious, ethnic or regional 
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differences. People who were divided between Eritrea and Ethiopia, such as 
the Afar and the Kunama, found their ethnic identities and rights suppressed 
in Eritrea, while their relatives across the border were offered a self-
administered state or zone. The two concepts just could not exist side by side 
without conflict. 
From early in the war, moreover, both parties exploited the situation and 
played the ethnic card to destabilize the other. Eritrea hoped for an uprising 
in Southern Ethiopia once the war broke out, and gave active support among 
others to the Oromo Liberation Front, in their futile attempt to revive the 
armed struggle from bases in Somalia. But Southern Ethiopia saw no general 
uprising. To the contrary, Ethiopia managed to mobilise considerable patriot-
ic feeling in the South ߄ albeit it lasted only for a short period.  
Ethiopia retaliated by supporting ethnic movements in Eritrea which tried 
to revive their languages and cultures and the ethnic identities of minorities. 
The Kunama were offered a radio station in Mekelle to disseminate pro-
grammes in their own language ߄ forbidden in Eritrea. The Afar had such 
radio programmes any way in their regional state on the Ethiopian side. Ethi-
opia also created a strain on Eritrean resources by deporting a considerable 
part of the Eritreans living in Ethiopia. Contrary to official propaganda, the 
confiscation of a large part of their individual property boosted the war econ-
omy in Ethiopia, while their return without money or jobs created a heavy 
strain on Eritrean war-torn economy ߄ not to forget the human tragedies it 
caused. (The economic consequences of expelling the Eritreans are only men-
tioned by TEKESTE and TRONVOLL. A recent article by STEFANIE CHRIST-
MANN suggests that the money confiscated was used to buy weapons against 
Eritrea.) 
Differences in economic policy added to the conflict, and were aggravated 
by the war. The introduction of a new currency in Eritrea in 1997 revealed a 
long lasting split in economic interests, which led to a competition between 
new industries built up in Eritrea and in Tigray. While the authors do not 
believe that this competition in itself caused the war, they do accept it as one 
major factor for why a border crisis could develop into a war. 
As another issue behind the conflict, the authors describe a growing feeling 
of difference between the Tigrigna-speaking people in Tigray and Eritrea. 
People in Tigray suspected the Eritrean highlanders for being unprincipled 
and for having opportunistically supported Italy against Ethiopia both in 
1896 and during 1936 to 41 and later. They felt embarrassed and insulted by 
Tigrean-Eritreans referring to their brethren from Tigray as rude and uncivi-
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lized peasants. Referring to each other as ߋShabiaߌ and ߋWoyaneߌ respective-
ly, the warring parties indicate their readiness to exploit memories of earlier 
and less flattering periods in their history to degrade and demoralize each 
other. Caused or exacerbated by the frustration of collective ambitions and 
violated identities, such conflict is potentially explosive, and does not easily 
allow peaceful cooperation nor democratic development. 
And the lack of democratic development, both in Ethiopia and in Eritrea, is 
in the final analysis the cause for the war, as TEKESTE and TRONVOLL see it. 
Eritrea is described as one of the most autocratic states in the world, a one-
party state with a democratically ratified constitution which has not been put 
in force, and a president whose control reaches out into every village and eve-
ry organization. Ethiopia has a constitution which in theory guarantees all 
individual and human rights, a free press and a transparent and democratic 
society. But practice follows a solid administrative tradition of a hierarchical 
and closed system, and political leadership on all levels is giving priority to 
control and the maintenance of power and positions, at the expense of ac-
countability or individual rights or security of the law.  
The authors refrain from allocating guilt or causes. Rather, they follow the 
conflict between the two brothers back into their common history of armed 
resistance against the military regime in Ethiopia from 1975 to 1991, into dif-
ferences which were only temporarily plastered over, and into contradictions 
of policy and ideology after 1991. Already in 1985, differences in ideology, 
policies and military strategies caused a breach in relations between the two 
fronts. TEKESTE and TRONVOLL do not identify any single issue so grave as 
to necessitate a war. They see two ߋreal issues behind the warߌ: the nature of 
economic competition between Tigrinya people in Eritrea and Tigray, and 
their competition about political influence and hegemony in the Horn of Af-
rica. Both issues have not been solved by the war. The title of the ߋpostscriptߌ 
to the book may thus prove realistic when it asks whether the two countries 
are on the way towards a state of ߋNo war ߄ no peaceߌ. Both people have 
gained nothing from the war, but have been thrown further back in their aspi-
rations towards democracy.  
 
STEFANIE CHRISTMANN has thus a point when she argues, in a recent arti-
cle, that both Eritrea and Ethiopia (and their people) lost this war, but that 
both leaders, Essayas Afewerki and Meles Zenawi, won it. Before the war 
started, she observes, the demands for democracy were increasing in Eritrea 
(but also in Ethiopia). The Eritrean constitution had been approved by the 
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Constitutional Assembly, but not put in force by the President. When the 
date for the election was to be announced, CHRISTMANN claims, Essayas 
started the war by ordering his troops to occupy Badme. And he succeeded 
in herding the Eritrean people back into acquainted wartime patterns of 
standing together whatever comes ߄ behind the President. 
While the war came as a surprise for Ethiopia, Meles used it skilfully to ral-
ly the Ethiopian opposition, particularly the nationalist urban population, 
behind his policy of defending the ߋsovereignty of Ethiopiaߌ. In face of a 
growing internal conflict in TPLF, this was no minor achievement. It may 
have played a significant role in allowing Meles recently to confront his 
rightwing opposition within TPLF.  
From a more distanced and principled viewpoint, JAMES C.N. PAUL, in a 
recent contribution to an anthology, offers us some clarifying glimpses into 
the legal, historical and social significance of ethnicity in the constitutions of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. JIM PAUL, with his experience in Ethiopia from the time 
he was Dean of the law faculty when it still was part of Haile Selassie I Uni-
versity, contrasts the different views on Ethnicity. His well argued and bril-
lantly formulated article gives a short analysis of ethnicity in both constitu-
tions, embedding it in a condensed but comprehensive glance through the 
history of ethnic differences and identities. He identifies three distinct ߋgen-
resߌ of Ethiopian history. One is the narrative of three thousand years of 
proud history of a Christian Abyssinian Empire in Northern Ethiopia, sym-
bolized in the Solomonic Dynasty of Emperors. The second is the history of 
the forceful incorporation of other peoples to the South, West and East of the 
core empire. The third is the story of the causes, consequences and implica-
tions of the implosion of the Ethiopian Empire. ߋAll are controversial, and a 
synthesis of all three even more so.ߌ 
He continues to show that the Ethiopian Constitution can be seen as a 
ߋtreaty between the nations and the peoples of Ethiopia, who are portrayed as 
its authorsߌ. Or, ߋalternatively, it might also be seen as part of an ingenious 
߇divide-and-rule߈ political strategy which enabled the TPLF ߑ to legitimate its 
power.ߌ As for Eritrea, JIM PAUL deplores that the provisional government 
has postponed elections indefinitely, simply by failing to act. The legal status 
of the constitution remains problematic. Eritreans have been urged to abstain 
from politics, and the Eritrean peasants do not have any influence on the 
broad lines of their development. 
For both countries, JIM PAUL concludes saying: ߋThe case study sketched 
here has a broader relevance. It reflects a history of state failure similar to the 
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recent histories of other African states. It suggests the limitations ߄ and risks 
߄ of efforts to alleviate grievances, generated by state failure, by recourse to 
problematic, officially imposed theories of ethnicity, self-determination and 
ethnic federalism, or by recourse to dogmatic, official doctrines prescribing 
national unity and centralized governance. It suggests the need to convert 
juridical states into organic social formations ߄ and the need to rethink the 
fundamental tasks of states in the African context.ߌ 
 
There is hardly much to add for a summary, except, maybe, that the four 
books and two articles together show that ethnicity matters in politics in 
Africa. Ethnic identity is understood as meaningful where the state is expe-
rienced only as predator, not as provider of resources nor as facilitator of 
development, nor even as liberator. What counts is people߈s feelings about 
their experience of being suppressed, exploited, and despised. Peace will not 
be won before each one of the different peoples and each individual within 
them have experienced the proud consciousness of being free from undue 
repression and having an influence on matters of common concern. This 
consciousness may be called democracy, or gada, xeer, or seera, or what-
ever. It may be organized in states or regions or villages or in the United 
Horn of Africa. In any case, the Horn can not achieve peace without win-
ning peace with its ethnic differences. 
VESTAL߈s book may be especially important as a collection of the record of 
the Ethiopian government after 1991 in terms of violation of human rights. 
Particularly important as a source for researchers may appear his collection of 
companies in the economic empire built up by TPLF and affiliated individu-
als. Unfortunately, this list is not up to date: new companies have been added 
to the TPLF empire since this list was published in Ethiopian Review in 1996.  
It is a shame that VESTAL allowed someone who has no idea about Ethio-
pian names to re-arrange his ߋselected bibliographyߌ, putting Ethiopians into 
the alphabetical list under their second ߄ that is, their fathers߈ ߄ name. To 
find, for example, Alemayehu Gebre Mariam under ߋMariamߌ is, to say the 
least, annoying. No-one will ever be able to find Alemayehu in this alphabet, 
since ߋGebre Mariamߌ, not Mariam, is the first name of Alemayehu߈s father. 
The malaise is not made better by the fact that both LEENCO LATA߈s book 
and TEKESTE and TRONVOLL߈s suffered the same fate. Also in their biblio-
graphies, the publishers have inverted Ethiopian names. They were more 
lucky, however, in that theirs do not include authors whose fathers happen to 
Siegfried Pausewang 
Aethiopica 4 (2001) 224
have names consisting of two words. At least, someone who is used to the 
malpractice can find an author by looking for his father. 
CHABAL and DALOZ have a wider public and have already received a more 
comprehensive reception in other context. Their book offers no solution ߄ 
but it is an important contribution to re-think the political dimensions of de-
velopment in Africa. In the final analysis, they point in the direction of re-
assessing political identities in an African context. With it goes a more  
thorough debate on the role of the state in Africa. A debate for which it is 
high time.  
The book by LEENCO LATA should in particular offer food for thought to 
the Oromo refugees in Europe and America. Many of them have been and 
some continue to act as a political lobby to preserve a fighter-mentality and a 
feeling of victimisation, a readiness for armed struggle. Their conservative 
influence may prevent a reorientation in the political attitudes of the Oromo 
living in Ethiopia. Both could gain from a new attitude which looks at democ-
racy as an exit from the present predicament  towards liberation of all peoples 
and a  fruitful cooperation for development in the Horn of Africa, on all sides 
of cultural and political borders. 
TEKESTE and TRONVOLL have endeavored a difficult analysis of the events 
and reasons behind the war. They have brought forward a considerable mate-
rial. Their ߋappendixߌ collects all the more important documents on the war 
and the negotiations, and is a valuable resource for further research. In addi-
tion, the book contains original material such as interviews with leading polit-
ical figures from both sides in the war, which shed new light on some of the 
more obscure aspects of political thinking in the two fronts. Their book is a 
valuable addition to literature on Eritrea and Ethiopia, and an important 
source for further research. 
